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The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation,
Is the Cure
Elisabeth Sperow*
I. INTRODUCTION

When first announced, the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. City of New
London' was denigrated by some as the death of property2 and hailed by others as
the word of God.3 Now that a year has passed and the dust has cleared, the initial
legacy of this controversial decision can be evaluated. So far, the main result has
been a great deal of publicity and debate regarding the use of eminent domain;
actual change in the treatment of eminent domain has appeared in legislation in
thirty-seven states, one congressional appropriations bill, and an executive order
of limited application. Ironically, the public outcry, rather than the enacted
legislation, may prove to be the wake-up call needed to ensure that elected
officials reserve the use of eminent domain for truly public purposes. Individuals
concerned about the use of eminent domain need to hold their representatives
accountable at the polls to ensure that they exercise the eminent domain power
responsibly.
This article assesses how, although the Kelo opinion invited the states'
response, newly passed legislation does not root out the actual evil of eminent
domain: abuse by government officials. It has always been and continues to be
the case that courts defer to the opinions of government officials regarding what
is best for the people absent clear and convincing evidence that the governing
bodies' opinions are misguided. Eminent domain can play an important role in
society by allowing the government to serve the public interest through the
acquisition of property the government might not otherwise be able to obtain.
The Kelo decision merely adhered to the Court's holdings in a previous line of
cases applying a broad interpretation of what constitutes a public use under the
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1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Joseph Sabino Mistick, Farewell Sweet Friend,PITrSBURGH TRIB. REV., July 3, 2005 ("The
United States Supreme Court announced the death of property when it ruled in Kelo v. City of New London that
local officials can take your property and give it to anyone that they deem more worthy.").
3. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Condemnation Nation: The Big Business of Eminent Domain, HARPER'S
MAG., Oct. 2005, at 75 (quoting then House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi as saying the Kelo ruling was "as if
God had spoken").
4. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 534-35 (2006) (discussing how many
"socially useful projects may not be completed" without eminent domain).
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Fifth Amendment. This broad interpretation is necessary to give governments the
flexibility to serve the public good, yet still provide a necessary check in case of
abuse. The interesting lesson of the Kelo case has been the haste with which
politicians condemned the ruling and attempted, with mixed results, to strip
themselves of the ability to exercise their discretion rather than vowing to use it
more appropriately. Instead of condemning the ruling and passing new laws,
these politicians should look at how they use eminent domain and make sure they
do so only in the best interest of the public. When politicians fail to serve the
public interest, voters should be ready to vote them out of office.
This article begins in Part II by discussing the development of eminent
domain from the British system to more recent United States Supreme Court
rulings.5 Part III analyzes the Kelo decision to show its place among recent
eminent domain precedents.6 Next, Parts IV, V, and VI address the response to
the Kelo decision from the federal legislature,7 some state legislatures, s and the
executive branch of the federal government.9 These Parts show that while these
responses may have been well-intentioned, the responses fail to resolve the real
issue. Part VII analyzes the response in the state and federal court systems.'"
Finally, the article proposes that, while many critics lambasted Kelo as a grievous
injury to homeowners' rights throughout America, it actually did little to change
the overall status of eminent domain in the United States." Although many
politicians, citizens' groups, and legal scholars have called for dramatic revisions
to eminent domain law, this article argues that application of the Fifth
Amendment, coupled2 with political accountability and judicial oversight, is the
appropriate remedy.
II. HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN

A. British Origins
Despite the popular belief that "a man's home is his castle"' 3 and is therefore
off limits to government seizure, the use of eminent domain to seize private
property significantly predates the founding of the United States. Hugo Grotius, a

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part [I.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
See infra Part VIII.
See infra Part IX.
It is believed that this phrase was coined by Sir William Coke to mean that, in a military context, an
Englishman had the right to use deadly force to defend his home. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND

CRIMINAL CAUSES 161-62 (R.H. Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams, Jr. eds., 1986).
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legal scholar and writer, first coined the phrase "eminent domain" in the
seventeenth century.'" Generally, historians find that governments derive the
ability to exercise eminent domain from natural law as an incident of sovereign
power. 5 In early Britain, the sovereign could seize private property for his or her
personal pleasure or for the public's use. 6 Because the sovereign was deemed the
ultimate owner of all property, and private citizens were merely being given the
right to use the land, no compensation was provided or necessary in the event of
a seizure. 7 Later, property rights were placed in the hands of Parliament, where
they remain today.'8
The early British tradition continued into Colonial America, where eminent
domain was used frequently for things such as building roads and dams.'9 In fact,
as early as 1639, formal statutes existed that allowed local governments to take
private land to build roads. 0 Additionally, many state constitutions did not have
21
clauses requiring just compensation in the event of a taking.
B. The United States Constitution and Eminent Domain
After the American Revolution and the creation of the independent
government of the United States, the United States Constitution provided greater
protections for private property than early Colonial law had afforded. Yet, along
with these greater protections, 3 the Constitution codified eminent domain with
the addition of the Fifth Amendment, providing that "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."24 The wording of the clause,
while controversial, implies that it is permissible for the government to take

14.

Martin J. King, Rex Non ProtestPeccare???:The Decline and Fall of the Public Use Limitation on

Eminent Domain, 76 DICK. L. REV. 266, 268 n.11 (1971-1972) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACLS, Lib. 11I,Cap. xx (1631)).
15. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
16. Elizabeth U. Witmer, Looking to the States to Ride Herd on Kelo, THE METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., 47 Vol. 14, No. 4, Apr. 2006 at 4.
17. Katherine M. McFarland, Note, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandate
for Stricter Scrutiny for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 145 (citing
Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595 (2002)).
18. Daniel Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Plannersand Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
803, 847-48 (2006).
19. JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.01[3] (3d ed. 2005).
20. Cohen, supra note 4, at 491.
21. 545 U.S. 469, 508 n.l (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056-57 (1992))
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22. See U.S. CONST. amends. III & IV; RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985); JOHN N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS; POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 295 (1996).

23. For example, the Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in homes without consent
and the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause prior to the search and seizure of property. U.S. CONST.
amends. Ill-IV.
24.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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private property for public use as long as the government provides just
compensation. Or, as Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit stated, "A man's
2 home
may be his castle, but that does not keep the government from taking it.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the historical foundation of eminent domain
when it noted that the Fifth Amendment was a "tacit recognition of preexisting26
power to take private property for public use rather than [a] grant of new power.,
The Court further affirmed that "[t]he power of appropriating private property to
public purposes is an incident of sovereignty."" Accepting that some types of takings
are constitutionally permissible and even socially necessary, the remaining questions
are what is "public use" and what is "just compensation?" Although some legal
theorists and judges may argue otherwise, there is no conclusive legislative history to
assist in interpreting what the Framers meant by these phrases; 28 thus, the courts have
exercised judicial review to establish the confines of eminent domain.
Defining "just compensation," so far, has been easier to do: just compensation is
commonly considered the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking.29
In certain circumstances, however, condemnees may also be entitled to reasonable
moving expenses and other bonus payments above the fair market value of their
property." Many scholars argue that the fair market value standard provides
inadequate compensation because it does not account for sentimental or other noneconomic value condemnees may place on their homes.' Some even argue that
increasing the amount of compensation the government must pay condemnees is a
better route to curtailing the government's use of eminent domain than limiting the
definition of public use.32 Although the Supreme Court has recently addressed the
issue of just compensation,33 the current focus of the Kelo-inspired eminent domain
debate, and of this article, is on answering the first question: What is a public use?

25. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
26. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
27. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
28. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995) (evaluating whether the Takings Clause may have originally been
intended to protect against physical takings rather than to determine fair value).
29. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1945); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601-4655 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-56-101 to -113 (2003); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-266 to -282 (2001).
31. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 297-98 (2000);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 83 (1986).
32. John Fee, Eminent Domain and The Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 785
(2006).
33. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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C. Defining "Public Use"
Traditionally, courts have interpreted the public use requirement to allow the
government, under its police powers,3 4 to seize property to develop public
necessities such as roads, utilities, hospitals, and other publicly used facilities."
Most of the outrage over Kelo focused on the fact that the government was taking
land from private individuals and giving it to other private individuals for
economic development with the anticipation that the new private individuals' use
would reap public benefits such as new jobs and increased tax revenue. While
much disdained, the Kelo decision was simply a continuation of the consistent
deference the Court has shown to publicly elected state3 6 and federal entities in
determining public uses.37 Despite commentary to the contrary, this broad
interpretation of a public use may be the best way to preserve private property
rights.3" If the interpretation of public use is too narrow, governments may resort
to other powers, such as regulatory or tax powers, to achieve their goals without
having to pay any compensation. A broad interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment, as in Kelo, however, allows governments to use eminent domain as
they deem necessary as long as they provide just compensation to the injured
parties. Prior to Kelo, the Court approved the use of eminent domain in two
situations where the publicly seized land ended up in the hands of private owners.
D. Supreme Court PrecedentPaving the Way for Kelo
In Berman v. Parker,0 the Court outlined its deference to elected bodies,
stating, "The role of the judiciary in determining whether [eminent domain]
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."4 ' The
Berman Court approved the District of Columbia's use of eminent domain to end
"substandard housing and blighted areas" by allowing it to redevelop privately
owned land and sell it to private parties. 2

34. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
35. Kurlantzick, supra note 3, at 72.
36. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406 ("[C]ases have interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protection against uncompensated deprivations of private property by the
States as though it incorporated the text of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause.").
37. Although the Court shows great deference to federal and state legislatures, it has not completely
relinquished its role and has noted that "the nature of a use, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial
question." Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
38. See infra PartV.
39. Id.
40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41. Id. at 32.
42. Id. at 32-33.
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In 1945, Congress passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act "to
provide for the replanning and rebuilding of slum, blighted, and other areas of the
District of Columbia. ' 3 In response, the National Capital Planning Commission
identified an area in the southwest of the District of Columbia where more than
fifty-seven percent of the buildings had outside toilets, more than sixty percent
had no baths, and over sixty-four percent were deemed beyond repair." The
Planning Commission proposed to condemn the area to create a more attractive
and safe community and to improve public health. 5 The plaintiffs department
store, while not itself a dilapidated housing building, fell within the parameters of
the designated area and was thus subject to condemnation. 46 The plaintiff argued
that it was unconstitutional to take his property because it was commercial and
ultimately it was going into private hands for a private use.4 ' The Court rejected
the plaintiffs arguments and held that the goal of redeveloping the blighted
neighborhood was within congressional power and, "once the object is within the
authority of Congress[,] the means by which it will be attained is also for
Congress to determine." ' Thus, Berman clearly established that it is constitutionally acceptable for the government to use eminent domain to transfer private
property from the hands of one private party to another when the goal is to
achieve an appropriate public benefit.
The next public use case came thirty years later. In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,"9 a unanimous Court affirmed Berman's precedent and foreshadowed Kelo. In Midkiff, the Court continued its deference to the
determinations of publicly elected bodies by rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge to
the Hawaii Legislature's Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967. This Act allowed the
use of eminent domain to redistribute land from lessors to lessees, ending a longstanding land oligopoly in the state. 0 The Court stated that it would not substitute
its judgment for that of the Hawaii Legislature regarding what is a public use
"unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."5 ' Furthermore, the
Court stated that "if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial
reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination
that the taking will serve a public use."52

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Act of Aug. 2, 1946, 79 Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790 (1945).
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896)).
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In Midkiff, Hawaii was attempting to break up a historically created land
oligopoly that had resulted in ownership of forty-seven percent of Hawaiian
property by a mere seventy-two individuals.53 The law allowed the Hawaii
Housing Authority to condemn certain property to enable current lessees to
purchase it from the lessors. 4 Not surprisingly, the lessors challenged the law as
an unconstitutional use of eminent domain because it resulted in private property
being placed in the hands of other private individuals.5 Foreshadowing Kelo, the
Court rejected this argument and held that a public use can still be served even if
the property ends up in the hands of private individuals. 6 Midkiff, in keeping in
line with Berman, continued the Court's deference to a publicly elected body's
determination regarding the appropriate goal and how best to achieve it. Here, the
public purpose of breaking up the land oligopoly was served by redistributing the
land through forced sales. In Kelo, the Court would go one step further by
allowing an anticipatedpublic benefit to suffice.
III. THE KELO DECISION
In Kelo, the Court followed "a century of precedent ' 5 7 when it considered
whether the city of New London's use of eminent domain to acquire property
from unwilling sellers to further a development plan qualified as a public use
under the Fifth Amendment. The Court considered three questions: 1) whether
the taking constituted a public purpose; 9 2) whether the Court should adopt a
bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public
purpose; 6° and 3) whether the Court should require a reasonable certainty that the
expected benefits will accrue before approving the taking.6'
62
The property in question was located in the Fort Trumbull area of the city.
Fort Trumbull housed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center until the federal
government closed it in 1996.63 Even before the closing of the Center and the
resultant firing of 1500 people, the state had designated the area as a "distressed
municipality." 6 The state and city asked the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a non-profit development agency created by the city, to try

53. Id. at 232.
54. Id. at 233.
55. Id. at 243.
56. Id. at 245.
57. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005).
58. The Fifth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
60. ld. at 484.
61. id. at 487.
62. Id. at 473.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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to revitalize the area's economy. The NLDC, with the help of funding through
bonds, created Fort Trumbull State Park.65 In addition, Pfizer, Inc. announced
plans to build a $300 million research facility immediately adjacent to the Fort
Trumbull area.66 The NLDC then submitted a plan to build a waterfront
conference hotel, restaurants, stores, marinas for recreational and commercial
usage, eighty new residences, a United States Coast Guard museum, and 90,000
square feet for research and development office space and other facilities.67 To
achieve their goal, the NLDC purchased most of the property in the ninety-acre
area. 6' However, there were nine homeowners who refused to sell their property.
The NLDC then exercised the city's power of eminent domain to acquire the
remaining property, which the property owners challenged. 69
The petitioners included Susette Kelo, who had lived in her Fort Trumbull
area home since 1997, Wilhelmina Dery, who was born in her home in 1918 and
lived in it her whole life, and seven other homeowners. 7° They argued that the
city's use of eminent domain to further economic development violated the
public use requirement in the Fifth Amendment and urged the Court to adopt a
bright-line rule stating that economic development could never qualify as a
legitimate public use.7'
The City of New London argued that its plan would serve a public use
because it was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and
other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city. '72 Thus, while
the condemned property was not being turned over directly to the public or a
public entity, the anticipated economic advantages that would flow from the
redevelopment of the area would benefit the public.
In a divided court,73 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justices Souter, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, holding that the plan
"unquestionably serves a public purpose" and thus the proposed takings were
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.74 The Court recognized that "it has
long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole
purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation."" In this case, however, the Court found that even though the
taking resulted in the transfer of private property from the hands of one group of
private individuals to the hands of another group of private individuals, the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 475 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
Kelo was a five to four decision with Justices O'Connor and Thomas filing dissents. Id. at 471.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 477.
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transfer was permissible. It held the transfer was part of a "carefully considered"
plan that was designated to benefit the community as a whole and not just one
individual.76 Thus, the difference between an unconstitutional transfer of property
between two private individuals and a constitutional one seems to lie in the
motives of the political bodies and the anticipated beneficiaries. Justice Kennedy,
in his separate opinion, elaborated on this point, making it clear that if the
government's intent had been to confer private benefits onto private parties, the
taking would be unconstitutional." Therefore, although benefits arguably flow to
private parties in situations like Kelo, where the intent is to construe benefits on
the public as a whole, as in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo, the taking is
constitutional.
The Court also rejected the petitioners' request for the adoption of a brightline rule against allowing economic development to serve as a public purpose
because it would create an artificial restraint on the concept of public use." The
Court noted that it has long considered economic development to be an
appropriate use of eminent domain and, "[c]learly, there is no basis for
exempting economic development from [its] traditionally broad understanding of
public purpose. 79
In addition, the Court rejected requiring some level of reasonable certainty
that the expected benefits will actually accrue, holding such a requirement would
hinder the ability of governments to exercise the power of eminent domain. 80 The
Court noted that a holding that required postponing a judicial ruling on every
alleged taking until this level of certainty had been met would "unquestionably
impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such
plans.""
The controversial nature of this decision is clearly exhibited in the dissenting
opinions written by Justices O'Connor and Thomas. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, argued that the decision abandoned the
long-term holding that the government may not take property from A and give it
to B82 and that Kelo's broad interpretation effectively deleted the words "public
use" from the Takings Clause. 3 She distinguished Berman and Midkiff by stating
that the language the Kelo Court relied on as precedent from those opinions was
actually "unnecessary" and even "errant" dicta. 84 She further distinguished those
cases as examples where the pre-condemnation nature of the properties

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 487-88 (majority opinion).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 501.
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themselves necessitated the taking of the property to serve the public purpose: the
blighted condition in Berman and the unfair land distribution in Midkiff.85
In his dissent, Justice Thomas went a step further and stated his belief that
the Court should reconsider all of the current eminent domain cases, including
Berman and Midkiff, which, in his view, have "strayed from the Clause's original
meaning."86 He then focused on his interpretation of the original meaning of the
Fifth Amendment and what he considered its "natural reading" to find that the
Court had created much too broad an interpretation of "public use."87 Finally, he
argued that Kelo rendered the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment a
"virtual nullity."88 Both dissenting opinions attempt to distinguish or question the
very validity of the Court's eminent domain precedent. Justice O'Connor's
attempt to discredit the persuasive language of Midkiff and Berman failed to
attract the support of the majority of the Court. In any event, as a result of the
Kelo decision, the language she discredited is now binding precedent. Her
attempt to factually distinguish the intended uses of the properties also failed to
persuade a majority of the Court. In all three cases, the elected bodies were
attempting to meet a public need best served by transferring ownership of the
properties. Furthermore, if the Court is to follow its practice of deferring to the
judgment of publicly elected bodies, it should not question the particular use of
each plot of land, but rather, as in Kelo, make sure that the taking is part of a
well-considered plan motivated to benefit the public as a whole. Justice Thomas'
desire to revisit the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence and apply a different
historical interpretation of the Fifth Amendment may come to pass someday, but
at this time it appears he is alone on the Court in holding that novel view.
Overall, the Kelo decision correctly stands for the proposition that the Court
will give great deference to a legislative body's decision to use eminent domain
and continue to apply a broad interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's "public
use" clause to mean any "public purpose," even one that is speculative. While it
is always disturbing to hear of someone's home being taken by the government,
our society has long held that sometimes the rights and interests of the individual
must give way to the greater good.89 Despite the uproar indicating the contrary,
the Kelo ruling adhered closely to precedent in this area and was an example of
the Court deferring to the determinations of politically elected bodies regarding
the public's best interest; it was not the Court engaging in judicial activism. In
fact, two months after issuing the ruling, Justice Stevens told an audience that
had he been a legislator, instead of a judge bound by precedent, he would have

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
FOREST L.
were to be

Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508-14.
Id. at 506.
Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophy, 41 WAKE
REv. 237, 243-44 (2006) (discussing how our nation was shaped by a belief that individual interests
sacrificed for the greater good).
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voted differently. 9° The Kelo Court, perhaps anticipating the public uproar the
opinion would generate, clearly passed the baton to the legislative branch to
determine what limits there should be on eminent domain, stating, "nothing in
our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise
of the takings power."9' Thus, in a misguided flurry, state and federal legislatures
picked up the baton and ran with it.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE KELO RULING
Immediately following the Kelo ruling, Congress appeared to spring into action
in such a forceful manner that the Washington Post dubbed Congress's action "an
unprecedented uprising to nullify a decision by the highest Court in the land."92 The
New York Times called it "a rare display of unanimity that cuts across partisan and
geographic lines." 93 This bi-partisan effort included pairing members from opposite

sides of the political spectrum, such as placing conservative Republican Speaker of
the House Tom DeLay with liberal Democratic Representative Maxine Waters. 94 The
House of Representatives took the unusual step of adopting by a vote of 365 to 33 a
resolution deploring the Court's ruling and stating that state and local governments
"should not construe Kelo as justification to abuse the power of eminent domain."95
'
Although this act may seem insignificant, it may actually have been the most
appropriate path for Congress to take: it reminded governments they should not
abuse the eminent domain power, but it did not create any new laws or requirements.
The majority of the congressional criticism seemed to focus on the Court's
approval of "economic development" as an appropriate public purpose. 96 Many

politicians denounced the ruling as an attack on African Americans, homeowners,
small business owners, and poor people and even called the decision "anathema to
our basic core values."97 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. went so far as to compare it with one of the most reviled
judicial
98
decisions of all times by calling it the "Dred Scott of the 2 1st Century.,
In addition to the verbal lambasting of the decision, senators and
representatives introduced fourteen unnecessary bills in the House and Senate
90. John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.
91. Kelo, 545 U.S. 489 (majority opinion).
92. Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Has Strong Repercussions, WASH. POST, July 23,
2005, at Fl.
93. John M. Broder, supra note 90, at Al.
94. Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property, WASH. POST,
July 1, 2005, at Al.
95. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
96. See, e.g., Jennifer Dobner, Utah Senator to Introduce FederalProperty Rights Bill, AP PRESS ST. &
Loc. WIRE, July 6, 2005, at Al (quoting Utah Senator Orin Hatch).
97. David Lightman, Lawmakers Stand up to Court, Bipartisan Coalitions Hope to Dilute Impact of
Eminent Domain Ruling, HARTFORD COURANT, July 1, 2005, at A l (quoting Texas Senator John Comyn).
98. Id. (referring to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which was repudiated in Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
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that would place different types of limits or restrictions on eminent domain. 99
However, despite the vocal condemnations and flurry of bill writing, in the year
following the Kelo ruling, Congress passed only one federal law addressing the
issue, and it came in the form of an amendment restricting the use of funds in an
appropriations bill.
On November 30, 2005, President Bush signed House Resolution 3058 into
law.'04 The Act approved funding for the Departments of Transportation,
Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of
Columbia, and other independent agencies for fiscal year 2006.' ° ' The funding
provision clearly refutes the Kelo ruling by providing that none of the money
appropriated to these agencies "may be used to support any Federal, State, or
local projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain, unless eminent
domain is employed only for a public use .... [F]or purposes of this section,
public use shall not be construed to include economic development that primarily
benefits private entities."'' 2 Thus, Congress used one of its most powerful
weapons, the power of the purse, to restrict the ability of several federal agencies
to use federal funding in Kelo-type situations where the property is going to be
used by other private parties for economic development. This law does address
the issue, but does not go as far as one might expect given the vehement
denouncements made by so many legislators.
There were two significant bills introduced in the Senate but neither made it
beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee. The first, House Resolution 4128, the
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005,'03 would have penalized state and
local governments that use eminent domain to obtain private property that is later
used for economic development by denying them federal economic funds for a
two-year period. This bill passed in the House by a 378 to 38 margin on
November 3, 2005, but never made it beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The bill was too harsh in its scope. It would have deterred local governments
from exercising the long-established right to use eminent domain for actions such
as revitalizing blighted areas.104

99. See Am. Planning Ass'n, FederalEminent Domain Legislation in the 109th Congress: Status of Key
Bills, http://www.planning.org/policyconference/pdf/eminentdomainchart.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the proposed bills: S.B. 1313, S.B. 1704, S.B. 1883, H.R. 3058, H.R.
340, H.J. Res. 340, H.R. 3083, H.R. 3087, H.R. 3135, H.R. 3315, H.R. 3405, H.R. 4088, and H.R. 4128).
100. Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 852 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. H.R. Res. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
104. An example of the successful use of eminent domain to revitalize a blighted area can be found in
the author's former hometown of Silver Spring, Maryland. See Andrew Ackerman, Voters in 10 States Pass
Measures to Curb Eminent Domain, 358 BOND BUYER 7 (Nov. 9, 2006) (quoting the director of the
Montgomery County Finance Department as saying that eminent domain was an "important tool" in completing
this transformation).
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The second bill, Senate Bill 1313, Protection of Homes, Small Businesses,
and Private Property Act of 2005, would have prevented states from using federal
funds in any way to exercise eminent domain for economic development
purposes.' 5 It was introduced in the Senate on June 27, 2005 and it also never left
the Senate Judiciary Committee.1°6 It too shared the flaw of being overbroad in
scope and deterring states from using the eminent domain power in ways that
may be necessary for the public good.
Despite the limited success of the 109th Congress, when the 110th Congress
convened in 2007, it once again tackled the issue by introducing new legislation.
There are two bills that specifically address Kelo: The Private Property Rights
Protection Act 0 7 and the Strengthening the Ownership of Private Property Act of
2007 ("STOPP Act")."'5 The Private Property Protection Act was introduced in
the House on January 4, 2007 and was referred to a committee. It specifically
denounces Kelo and would deny federal funds for the use of eminent domain for
other than a narrowly defined "public purpose" or "public use."'" The STOPP
Act, which was introduced in the Senate on February 4, 2007, would prohibit the
use of eminent domain to take property from one private entity and give it to
another except in a few limited cases, such as building a prison or a hospital, or
in instances of a natural emergency."0 As of April 2007, both bills were sitting in
committees. The introduction of these bills so close to the opening of the new
congressional term shows that this issue is still very much on the minds of
congressional members. It will be interesting to see if, unlike their predecessors
in the 109th Congress, the members of the 110th Congress will enact these bills
into law.
Thus, despite strong words and much grandstanding, so far, the only
congressional limitation passed to limit the federal government's use of eminent
domain has been to restrict the spending of a handful of government agencies.
Congress can rarely be praised for inaction, but in this case, public denunciation
of the Kelo opinion followed by little actual change has been the appropriate
response. Any law Congress enacts and the President signs that seeks to overrule
Kelo would almost certainly be overturned as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."' Furthermore, while laws that do not directly seek to overturn Kelo but

105. Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005, S.B. 1313, 109th Cong.
(2005).
106. Id.
107. Private Property Rights Protection Act, S.48, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-48 (last visited May 7, 2007).
108. Strengthening the Ownership of Private Property Act of 2007, H.R. 926, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl10-48 (last visited May 7, 2007) [hereinafter
STOPP Act].
109. Private Property Rights Protection Act, supranote 107.
110. STOPP Act, supra note 108.
111. Bemard Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism,
and ConstitutionalPowers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 182 (2006).

2007 / PoliticalAccountability, Not Legislation, Is the Cure
instead seek to limit or whittle down the uses of eminent domain might be
constitutionally permissible," 2 they would be ill-advised.
Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky persuasively argue that
attacking the eminent domain power is "misguided," will actually harm rather
than help property owners, and will discourage governments from creating
publicly needed projects."3 They contend that the government can achieve its
land use goals through its powers of regulation and taxation without paying
compensation to private property owners; thus, eminent domain is actually the
least damaging route the government can use because it is the only one that
guarantees compensation." 4 Therefore, congressional criticism coupled with
legislative inaction enabled the public to know that their representatives
understood their dissatisfaction with the Court's ruling yet did not create
unnecessary or unconstitutional legislation. The state legislatures, however, were
a bit more fruitful in their legislative responses to the Kelo ruling.
V. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO KELO

Just as Kelo caused an immediate backlash in Congress, it also "set off a
landslide of legislation in statehouses around the country."" 5 In all, forty-seven
states introduced more than 325 measures addressing eminent domain in the year
following Kelo."16 In California alone, there were eleven bills addressing eminent
domain introduced during the 2005-2006 session." 7 "I have never seen a response
to a Supreme Court decision this dramatic," said Larry Morandi, a land use
specialist for the National Conference of State Legislatures.'8 The problem with
state legislation, however, is that it often is not clear enough to offer any real
protections. Also, it has been shown that there is not necessarily a correlation
between state regulation, or lack thereof, and the exercise of eminent domain. "9
Thus, while public outrage clearly spurred new state legislation, the states may
have been going in the wrong direction. Rather than encouraging legislators to
pass bills and constitutional amendments, which may require interpretation by
the courts and adherence by elected officials, people should instead focus their
112. See id. (discussing the possible different constitutional bases for such limitations and the potential
problems of each).
113. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REv.
1412, 1415-16 (2006).
114. Id.
115. Elizabeth Mehren, States Acting to ProtectPrivateProperty, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at Al.
116. Id.
117. California Redevelopment Association, Legislative Bill Report 2005-2006 California State and
FederalLegislation Key Eminent Domain Bills, July 12, 2006 (referencing AB 1162, AB 1990, ACA 15, ACA
22, SB 53, SB 1210, SB 1650, SB 1809, SCA 15, SCA 20, and SCA 24).
118. Mehran, supra note 115, at A1.
119. Daniel Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 803, 829 (2006) (discussing the great variance in states' willingness to use eminent domain despite the
availability of state law).
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efforts on electing individuals who will responsibly exercise the eminent domain
power.
Nevertheless, during the year following Kelo, legislatures in twenty-eight
states passed bills addressing eminent domain, twenty-four of which were
enacted, one of which was awaiting signature of the governor, and two of which
were vetoed by the governor.' 20 In the November 2006 elections, ten states,
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon and South Carolina, passed constitutional amendments or citizen
initiatives limiting their states' abilities to use eminent domain.12 Measures in
and Washington addressing eminent domain and regulatory
California, Idaho,
22
failed.'
takings
Although the states agreed with the need to quickly adopt new legislation
curtailing the use of eminent domain, they took many different approaches in
addressing the issue. The different legislative approaches can be placed into five
general categories: 1) prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic
development; 2) narrowly defining public use; 3) limiting eminent domain to
blighted properties; 4) increasing the procedural requirements involved in
exercising eminent domain; and 5) creating committees or taskforces to study the
issue. Some of the states limited their laws to one of the above categories'2 3 while
others passed laws encompassing all five.'24 For the reasons discussed below,
each category represents a flawed attempt to fix a problem that does not require
legislative redress.
In the first category, the states clearly rejected the Kelo ruling by prohibiting
the use of eminent domain for economic development, such as increased tax
revenue, additional jobs, or the transfer of property to a private party. 125 These
states, including Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia,
repudiated the reasoning in Kelo and made clear that in their states, anticipated
Brian Mitchell, Property Owners Win and Lose in the Year After Kelo Case Ruling, INVESTOR'S
120.
Bus. DAILY, June 22, 2006, at Al; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, EMINENT DOMAIN 2006
STATE LEGISLATION, Sept. 12, 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
121. Castle Coalition, 2006 Election Wrap Up: Voters Overwhelmingly Passed Eminent Domain
Reform, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/l18_.06pr.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also John Hill, Mixed Verdict Nationwide on Eminent Domain Proposals,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 9, 2006, at A 1l.
122. Hill, supra note 121, at All; Castle Coalition, supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.240(d), 29.030(b) (2006) (prohibiting the use of eminent domain
for economic development with certain exceptions).
124. See, e.g., 2006 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 163 (2006).
125. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.240(d), 29.35.030; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701(A)(2) (2006); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 1, § 816 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §
523.271 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § l62-K:2(IX-a)(b) (2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, §
1040(a) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2(11) (2007); S.B. 323, 2006 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); S.B. 3086,
95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (11. 2006) (awaiting the governor's signature).
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increases in tax revenues or jobs would not be enough to qualify as public use. If
used alone, this approach goes too far and will leave states hamstrung if they
need to revitalize blighted areas and find themselves without options other than
transferring the blighted property into private hands.
In the second category, states adopted laws specifically defining "public use"26
as the use or possession of property by public entities or the public at large.
These states, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Tennessee,
refused to accept the broad definition of public use adopted by the Kelo Court
and mandated a more narrow definition of public use as one where the public
directly benefits from the taking. The problem with this approach lies in the
inability of a state legislature to correctly anticipate all of the public uses that it
may one day deem necessary in the public interest. Thus, the definition either
ends up too narrowly drawn or so broadly drawn that it will simply end up back
in the courts for judicial interpretation of an appropriate public use. Granted, the
courts will have more legislative history and legislative guidance to inform their
rulings, but the ultimate decision-maker will still be the courts.
The third category specifically explores, and sometimes limits, the use of
eminent domain to remove blight or other health or safety concerns. 27 Most of
the states adopting this approach, including Alabama, Missouri, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin, prohibit the use of eminent domain to acquire non-blighted properties
such as the homes at issue in Kelo. Blight is generally defined as a condition of
the property that creates health and safety hazards.'28 This category is too
restrictive and forecloses the possibility that the government may be able to
condemn non-blighted property when necessary to further the public interest. It
also smacks of elitism to say that only poor and run-down properties may be
subject to public need while the wealthier areas will not be subject to government
seizure for the greater good.
The fourth category of legislation makes changes to the eminent domain
procedure practiced within states without addressing the issues in Kelo. Instead,
Kansas, Missouri, and West Virginia aimed to increase public involvement
through more hearings or increased public notice prior to the exercise of eminent
domain. 129 In the event the enhanced procedures fail to prevent the exercise of
eminent domain, several states tried to take the sting out of the taking. For
example, Indiana provides that compensation for the taking of a person's home
be 150% of the fair market value 30 while Kansas requires 200% of the fair
126. See FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006); H.F. 2351, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 416.675(2) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 1, § 816 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162K:2(IX-a)(a) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (2007).
127. See ALA. CODE §§ 24-2-2, 24-3-2 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-17-102(2)(C) (2007); WIs. STAT. § 32.03(6) (2006).
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6) (2007).
129. S.B. 323, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (No.
2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-18-6, 51-1-2a (2006).
130. IND. CODE § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2006).
ANN.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38

market value.' 3' Additionally, Iowa included a provision enabling the original
owner to buy back his or her property if it is not put to a public use within five
years of the taking. 32
The statutes that attempt to make the eminent domain process more
transparent and open to public debate are probably the best of the bunch. They
will help ensure that the public is able to participate and see the role its
government representatives play. If citizens attend hearings and participate only
to see their opinions and wishes ignored, they can then hold those representatives
accountable in the next election. These statutes are also not direct attacks on the
Kelo ruling and, instead, attempt to lessen the use and effects of eminent domain
takings. Furthermore, they do not directly change the practice of eminent domain.
Instead, they allow for greater public participation in the eminent domain
process, which may lengthen the condemnation process, but may also lead to
better decision-making by the government and less anger on the part of citizens.
The statutes increasing compensation, however, are misguided. While the intent
behind them may be valid, to lessen the pain of those whose property is being
taken and make the action less desirable for the government, the actual result
penalizes taxpayers who end up paying higher rates.
Finally, exercising the ultimate in political caution, some states passed
legislation placing a moratorium on the use of eminent domain within the state to
allow committees or task forces to study the issue and make recommendations. 133
These states, Indiana and Utah, acknowledge their concern about the practice of
eminent domain and are seeking further input prior to acting. 3 4 It is hard to judge
the effectiveness of the moratoriums until the committees and task forces have
made their recommendations and the states have decided what action, if any, to
take.
Under the state laws in the first three categories, the factual situation in Kelo
would have been resolved differently. New London would not have been able to
claim the anticipated economic benefits of the project as a public use and it
would not have been able to seize the non-blighted homes. It is unclear how the
laws falling into the fourth category would have affected Kelo as the city had
already held hearings and given public notice prior to the takings, and the amount
of compensation was not addressed by the Court. The states adopting laws falling
into the fifth category are still awaiting recommendations so it is uncertain what
their ultimate effect will be. Overall, in the year following Kelo, the state
legislatures in less than a third of the states adopted eminent domain laws more
restrictive than the Supreme Court outlined.
Interestingly, despite the surge in state legislation, local governments appear
to be exercising their eminent domain power more frequently. A study by the
131.
132.
133.
134.

S.B. 323, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006).
H.F. 2351, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006).
S.B. 117, 2006 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006); H.B. 1010, 114 Gen. Assemb., 2d Leg. Sess. (Ind. 2006).
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Institute of Justice reported that since Kelo, 5783 properties have been seized or
condemned, which is two-and-a-half times greater than the number of
condemnations between 1998 and 2002.1 5 This increase may be attributed to the
publicity surrounding the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo, which may have
emboldened local governments and discouraged citizens from fighting the
condemnations. In any event, the most direct and definite approach for the states
to combat abuse of eminent domain is to ensure that state and local lawmakers
only use it in appropriate cases. This area is particularly ripe for accountability as
it is much easier for individuals to participate in the local lawmaking process.
Citizens can attend city council or town hall meetings, meet with representatives,
and have a much larger impact on local elections. It remains to be seen how the
slate of new laws will be applied and interpreted, so it is important for voters to
remain involved and hold local and state leaders accountable for their stances on
eminent domain cases.
VI. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO KELO

President Bush joined the side of those condemning the Kelo ruling by
issuing an executive order providing more symbolic support than actual impact.
His actions also proved the inadequacy of legislative responses. On June 24,
2006, the one-year anniversary of the Kelo ruling, President Bush signed an
executive order entitled "Protecting the Property Rights of the American
People."'316 This order prohibits the federal government from taking private
property, even with just compensation, "for the purpose of advancing the
economic interest of private parties."'37 The order specifically allows the use of
eminent domain for public purposes, such as hospitals, roads, parks, and
forests. '38
Although the order clearly rejects the type of taking allowed in Kelo, its
actual effect is more likely to be symbolic than substantive. Republican Senator
John Cornyn praised the order but noted the limited role that the federal
government plays in these types of projects.'39 Doug Kendall, executive director
of the Community Rights Council, went even further by stating, "This order
appears to apply to a null, or virtually null set of government actions .... I'm not
aware of any federal government agency that takes property for economic
development."'' 40 However, by issuing the order, President Bush joins the anti135. Mitchell, supra note 120, at Al.
136. Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 124 (June 28, 2006).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Bush Signs Executive Order Limiting Eminent Domain Powers of Federal Government, FOX
NEWS, June 24, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,200832,00.htnl (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
140. Jennifer Loven, Bush Order Would Limit Property Seizures, ABC News, http://www.abcnews.go.
com/Politics/print?id=2112909 (last visited July 6, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Kelo camp and makes it clear that, should the occasion ever arise, the federal
government will not be allowed to enjoy the leeway Kelo provided.
One area where the President could have a real impact on the issue of
eminent domain is in appointing new Justices to the Supreme Court. Since the
Kelo ruling, President Bush has appointed two Justices to the Supreme Court:
Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito. Although the
Kelo decision was frequently discussed during both of their confirmation
hearings,'' their views on eminent domain are unlikely to be decisive at this
point because they replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who were both in the Kelo dissent. Thus, even if
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito adhere to a less deferential view of
eminent domain power, it will not change the status quo unless another Justice
changes his or her view. In the event, however, that President Bush is able to
appoint another Justice to the Court, his or her position on Kelo could be
decisive.
VII. JUDICIAL AFTERMATH OF KELO
A.

The State Judicial Response

Disagreement with the Kelo ruling was not limited to the legislative and
executive branches. The Ohio Supreme Court, the first state supreme court to
address the Kelo ruling directly,' criticized its reasoning and applied a more
narrow definition of "public use" in interpreting the Takings Clause of the Ohio
Constitution. In Norwood v. Homey,143 the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the reasoning of Kelo and held that, "although economic factors may be
considered in determining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact
that the appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the government and
the community, standing alone," was not enough to constitute a public use under
the Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution.'" The Norwood court correctly
noted that it was not bound by the Kelo ruling because it was interpreting the45
Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution and not the United States Constitution.
A consulting firm retained by the City of Norwood had designated the
Norwood neighborhood in question a "deteriorating area."'146 The city adopted
that designation and held a number of public hearings before deciding to use

141. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S35, S57, S145, S174, S189, S235, S536 (2006); 151 CONG. REC.
S10,481, S10,529, S10,631, S10,635, S10,565 (2005).
142. Ian Urbina, Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006,
at A5.
143. Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1135-36 (Ohio 2006).
144. Id. at 1123.
145. Id. at 1136.
146. Id.at1125.
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eminent domain to appropriate the appellants' property as part of a
redevelopment plan.'4 7 The appellants filed suit and the trial court deferred to the
city's determination that the expected economic benefits from the appropriation
would constitute a public use.'4 8 The Ohio Supreme Court wrote a detailed
analysis of the shifting interpretations of "public use" and approvingly cited
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Kelo.' 49 The court then rejected the notion that the
city's determination was entitled to deference and held that "any taking based
solely on financial gain is void as a matter of law, and [that] the courts owe no
deference to a legislative finding that the proposed taking will provide financial
benefit to a community."' 5 Thus, the Norwood court looked at a factual situation
very similar to Kelo, acknowledged the Supreme Court's rulings, and went the
other way by finding economic benefit to be too broad an interpretation of the
intended definition of public use. Norwood exemplifies that additional legislation
is not needed for state court judges to adopt and follow their own standards of
review.
In addition to Ohio, twenty-nine other state court opinions had referenced the
Kelo ruling as of April 2007. Of those, eight distinguished Kelo,'"' one followed
it,'

5 2

and thirty-four merely cited it.' 53 Given the greater accountability state
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2006); Conti v. R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp., 900 A.2d 1221, 1231 (R.I. 2006); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 146
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judges have to the public, it will be interesting to see if other state courts follow
the Norwood court's lead and choose a more narrow definition of public use. If
not, the public could use its political leverage to ensure that judges with a
different interpretation are elected or appointed to the state benches.
B. The FederalJudicialResponse
In the federal judiciary, as of April 2007, five court opinions had followed
the Kelo ruling,'5 4 twenty-five opinions had cited it,'" and two opinions had
distinguished their cases from Kelo. 5 6 No cases had criticized or declined to
follow Kelo.' One court that distinguished its case from Kelo involved a due
process challenge to a property lien and was thus factually distinguishable from
Kelo and not merely an artful attempt to avoid Kelo's precedent.15 The federal

(S.D. 2006); Consol. Waste Sys., L.L.C. v. Metro Gov't of Nashville, No. M2002-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2005
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2006); Autoridad de Acueductos v. Compania de Parques Nacionales de P.R., No. KLCE2006-0251, 2006 PR
App. LEXIS 1360, at *9 (May 30, 2006); Administracion de Terrenos de P.R. v. Rivera Mercado, No.
KLCE0501241, 2006 PR App. LEXIS 175, at *10 (Jan. 31, 2006); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v.
Approximately 21.5969 Acres of Land, 47 V.I. 356, 369 (Super. Ct. 2006).
154. Western Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 Fed. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2006); MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship
v. City of San Rafael, No. C 00-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89195 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006); Hsiung v. City &
County of Honolulu, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 (D. Haw. 2005); Matsuda v. City & County of Honolulu, 378
F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1256 (D. Haw. 2005); Rumber v. District of Columbia, No. 04-1170 (RMU), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16935 (D.D.C. July 19, 2005).
155.
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F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2006); Didden v. Vill. of Port
Chester, 173 F. App'x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2006); Brody v.
Minnich, 434 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2005); McQ's Enters. Phila. Parking Auth., 143 F. App'x 439 (3d Cir.
2005; M&A Gabee v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of L.A., 419 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); Ash v.
Redevelopment Auth., 143 Fed. App'x 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005); Waldon v. Ramirez, No. CIV S-06-2139 MCE
GGHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21446 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); Mustard v. Lehman, No. CV-05-103-RHW,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89785 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2006); Lytle v. Potter, No. 3:05CV7254, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72974 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2006); Two Tenn., L.L.C. v. City of N. Little Rock, No. 3:06CV00063 JLH,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63809 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2006); Franco v. District of Columbia, 422 F. Supp. 2d 216,
218 (D.D.C. 2006); Autozone Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, No. 05-0476 (RMU), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11731, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006); Buffalo S. R.R. v. Village of Croton-On-Hudson, 434 F. Supp. 2d 241,
254 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); City of Guymon v. Cal. Farley's Boys Ranch Found., No. CIV-04-457-BA, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38506, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2005); Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); Benckini v. Upper Saucon Twp., No. 04-4304, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23765, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2005); Korsinsky v. Godici, No. 05 Civ. 2791 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20850, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2005); FMC Corp. v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (E.D.
Pa. 2005); Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola, No. C-04-5138-JF (PVT), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36804 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2005); Rumber v. District of Columbia, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2005);
George Wash. Univ. v. District of Columbia, 391 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2005); Cienega Gardens v.
United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 470 (2005).
156. Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 212 Ariz. 48 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2006); Griggs v.
Strumpfer, No. CV-F-05-1313 REC SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38438, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 30,2006).
157. A Shepard's Report from May 8, 2007 does not identify any federal cases as having criticized Kelo.
158. Griggs v. Strumpfer, No. CV-F-05-1313 REC SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38438, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
May 30, 2006).
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judiciary's failure to criticize Kelo is not surprising given the precedential value
of the Supreme Court ruling for the federal judiciary, as compared to the
independence state courts have in interpreting their own constitutions. Whether
the lower courts of the federal judiciary will embrace Kelo, attempt to distinguish
their cases from Kelo, or openly criticize the ruling has yet to be seen.
Given the one-vote margin of victory in the Kelo ruling and the apparent
misgivings of at least one Justice in the majority,'5 9 it will be interesting to see if
the Supreme Court revisits the issue in the near future. Until then, Supreme Court
precedent allowing anticipated economic benefits to qualify as a "public use"
under the Fifth Amendment shall reign and states remain free to interpret their
own constitutions as they see fit. This broad interpretation, coupled with
deference to political leaders, makes it clear that the real place to ensure the
appropriate use of eminent domain is the political arena.
VIII. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, NOT LEGISLATION IS
THE APPROPRIATE REACTION
Despite the time, money, and other resources spent to develop legislative
change in the status of eminent domain law, many questions remain regarding
what lasting repercussions these newly enacted state laws will have on the issue.
Will they withstand constitutional challenges? Will they be interpreted in a
meaningful way by the courts? Will they prove to be so overly restrictive that
they seriously hamper the government's ability to fulfill its necessary goals? All
of these questions need not be posed if we simply rely on the Fifth Amendment,
combined with political accountability and judicial review. In fact, political
accountability and participation even worked for Susette Kelo, the named
plaintiff. After negotiating with government officials, she was able to keep her
house, although it was moved to another location.' 6
Thus, for the best results, individuals should participate in the process and
negotiate with politicians. The politicians who are decrying the Kelo ruling and
calling out for reform are the very same individuals to whom the Court in Kelo
and its predecessors have deferred. Kelo is not an example of judicial activism
run amok, but rather carefully applied judicial restraint. In its eminent domain
jurisprudence, the Court has shown time and again that it will allow politicallyelected bodies great deference in determining what is an appropriate use of
eminent domain. Thus, the answer to the problem is for politically-elected
officials to carefully limit their use of eminent domain to cases where it is truly
necessary. If democratically elected bodies do not like the judicial deference

159. John M. Brooder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al
(quoting Justice Stevens as saying had he been a state legislator he would have ruled differently); Urbina, supra
note 142, at A5 (quoting Justice Stevens as calling the Kelo decision "unwise").
160. Elizabeth Mehren, Eminent Domain Plaintiff Will Keep Her House, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at
A15.
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being paid to them, perhaps the public needs to elect new leaders who feel more
capable of handling this task.
Rather than lobbying for the passage of new laws or lambasting the Court for
its deference, the public needs to participate in the process and hold its
democratically elected representatives accountable. Politicians need to listen to
the demands of their constituents and respond accordingly. Political
accountability, not unnecessary and flawed legislation, is the solution to the Kelo
debate. Any constitutional amendment or law is subject to judicial review, so the
better action is to strike at the source of the problem: the government leaders.
Instead of attacking the courts for upholding government actions, the public
should challenge the government for taking these actions. So it is up to the
public, grassroots movements, 6' and politicians to ensure that eminent domain is
used appropriately and not abused. For those cases where the government does
abuse its use of eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment, subject to judicial
review, remains in place as a check. 62 As Judge Richard Posner noted: "Property
owners and the advocates of property rights are not some helpless, marginalized
minority. They have plenty of political muscle, which they are free to use ....
Therefore, rather than wasting time and money drafting and passing problematic
legislation or criticizing the courts for their deferential stance, the public needs to
flex its muscles and force politicians to adhere to the values they have professed
or replace them with those who will.
IX. CONCLUSION
Now that a year has passed and the rhetoric has cooled, it is interesting to see
that the main action against the Kelo decision occurred in the very place invited
by the decision itself: the states. The real question today is whether the public
outcry and newly enacted state legislation will be enough to change the way
public officials exercise their power of eminent domain or, like Kelo, whether it

161. Interestingly, grassroots movements are finding some success in this area. See Brett D. Liles,
Comment, Reconsidering Poletown: In the Wake of Kelo, States Should Move to Restore Private Property
Rights, 487 ARIz. L. REV. 369, 394 (2006) (discussing the success of grassroots movements opposed to the use
of eminent domain in Arizona, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and New York).
162. Contrary to the opinion that courts view eminent domain as a blank check for government officials,
courts have been willing to overturn the use of eminent domain where they deemed it appropriate. See, e.g.,
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1229-30 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(finding that a church had a likelihood of success on its Fifth Amendment takings claim where its property had
been taken to allow development by a discount retailer); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that the city's attempt to take land from a small
business to favor Costco was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 689
N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) (finding that the taking of property surrounding the Detroit Metropolitan Airport
to build a technology park for the purpose of economic revitalization was not a public use under Michigan's
eminent domain Clause).
163. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term: Foreword:A Political Court, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 32, 98 (2005).
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was all much ado about nothing. In any event, the sure-fire way to prevent the
abuse of the eminent domain power is for the public to participate in the
condemnation process, follow the actions of their elected officials, and vote
accordingly.

